This approach requires the use of two types of source material. Wehrmacht records, primarily from the divisional level, form the foundation of the study. Such material provides a comprehensive account of both the unit's actions and its institutional mindset during the war. As several historians have noted, however, these records contain gaps, espedally concerning actions that fall outside traditional military engagements. Both Wolfram Wette and Hannes Heer have argued that German units purposely omitted such information from their files to ensure that the Wehrmacht's reputation remained unsullied. 4 One way of uncovering this 'missing history' is to use source material generated by the soldiers themselves, such as letters and diaries. As various published collections of letters clearly illustrate, many men had no qualms about sharing stories of atrodties and war crimes with their loved ones back home. s Whilst letters provide one means of penetrating the fog of war, they were subjected to censorship: both external (the state) and internal (either the individual's consdence or the sheer inability or disinclination to convey often disturbing thoughts and experiences to family and friends).6 Diaries offer a more personal view of war as they convey a soldier's immediate reaction to combat and occupation. The problem with such personal sources, of course, is how representative they are of the attitudes and beliefs within the ranks'? A judidous use of such individual voices alongside offidal Wehrmacht documents, however, allows historians to provide a more comprehensive account of the German Army's campaign in the Soviet Union.
The 121st Infantry Division has left a relatively wide assortment of sources for historians to investigate. In addition to the nearly complete war diaries for the Ia (operations), Ie (intelligence) and Ib (quartermaster) sections of the division during the first ten months of the campaign, various sub-unit war diaries as well as several diaries and memoirs penned by the rank-and-file exist. An examination of such source material leads to two important conclusions. First, whilst the division utilised coerdon in its attempts to quash the partisan movement, force never constituted its sole approach to the problem of insurgency; the 121st Infantry Division also made conciliatory gestures towards the dvilian population in hopes of ending its support for the partisans. Second, the individuals who fought within the ranks of the 121st Infantry Division had diverse reactions to the partisan threat and the dvilian population from which it emanated: acts of kindness and pity were mixed with violence and ideologically inspired hate during the first ten months of war. By examining the actions of the 121st Infantry Divisions within the context of the Reich's Eastern Army (Ostheer), some conclusions regarding the representativeness of its behaviour can be made. In fact,
